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Debtor's Defense To A Deficiency
Judgment Under UCC
On an issue of first impression in California, the third Appellate
District recently interpreted the Uniform Commercial Code, as
adopted in California, as providing cumulative remedies to a debtor
who had not received the prescribed notice. The case of Atlas
Thrift Co. v. Horan' held that where a creditor has failed to give
adequate notice as prescribed by Statute, the debtor has a defense
to a deficiency judgment, in addition to an action for damages.
In Atlas, Sam Horan, operator-proprietor of a delicatessen, agreed
to help his son-in-law secure financing to start a delicatessen of his
own. Defendant Horan and the son-in-law negotiated for a loan
with Atlas Thrift Company with whom Horan had had previous
dealings and with whom he enjoyed a good financial reputation.
Horan declined to sign the loan papers because of a provision in
the lease on his own delicatessen which forbade him to engage in a
similar business within twenty-five miles of the location. He did,
however, make verbal assurances to the finance company that he
was backing his son-in-law and was a "silent partner." Atlas agreed
to lend $10,000 to the son-in-law without Horan's signature and, in
addition filed a financing statement on the fixtures as security.
The son-in-law defaulted and the business failed. Subsequently
the son-in-law went into bankruptcy. Plaintiff Atlas petitioned
and obtained a release of the collateral by the trustee in bankruptcy.
Atlas did not deliver personally or by mail any notice to the
defendant Horan or his son-in-law of the intended sale and pro-
ceeded, after publication of the notice of sale, to "sell" the fixtures
and equipment to itself at its own office, for $2000.2 Prior to the
public sale by plaintiff, Atlas had located a buyer, Opper and Silk,
who had agreed to purchase the fixtures from Atlas for $5000. The
arrangement was consummated at a later date. Atlas then brought
suit for a deficiency against Horan and demanded the balance due
1. Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1972).
2. The market value of the fixtures and equipment was found by the
trial court to be $12,500. Id. at 1001, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
after default. This amounted to $15,000, offset by the proceeds of
the sale, $2000.
The trial court found that the secured party, Atlas, had not
complied with California Commercial Code section 9504 (3) which
requires personal or mailed notice and a commercially reasonable
sale.3 It also determined that defendant Horan was a debtor within
the meaning of California Commercial Code section 9105 subdivision
(1) (d) .4 However, relying on out of state authority which permits
deficiency judgments in spite of failure to comply with section
9504 (3) of the California Code, the court held that the remedies
provided for in section 9507 for the wronged debtor are exclusive.
Therefore, failure to comply with default provisions may not be
raised as an affirmative defense or bar to a deficiency action.'
The Appellate Court reversed the trial court and held that failure
to give notice and to conduct a commercially reasonable sale was a
bar to a deficiency judgment where raised as an affirmative de-
fense.6
In 1965 California's version of the Uniform Commercial Code,
including Article 9 which deals with secured transactions, be-
came effective. 7 Section 9-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code
provides that a secured party may repossess and sell his collateral
if the debtor defaults." However, the California version of the
Uniform Commercial Code requires the secured party to give notice
of the time and place of the sale, delivered personally or by mail
to the debtor.9 Every aspect of the disposition must also be con-
3. CAL. COM. CODE § 9504(3) (West 1964). The section numbers in the
official text of the Uniform Code are a composite number, such as section
9-504 in which the digit preceding the dash designates the article (Division
in California) in which the section appears. In the California Code the
dash has been removed from the section numbers so that section 9-504 of
the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE becomes section 9504 of the California Code.
WEST's ANN. CAL. CODES, FOREWORD, COMMERCIAL CODE, Vol. 23A (1964).
All references to section numbers contained herein, unless otherwise indi-
cated are to the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE as adopted by the California
Legislature in 1963 (Stats. 1963, ch. 819).
4. CAL. COM. CODE § 9105(1) (d) (West 1964).
5. 27 Cal. App. 3d at 1005, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
6. Id. at 1008, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
7. CAL. COM. CODE § 1101 et seq. (West 1964).
8. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504(1), sometimes referred to as
the CODE.
9. CAL. COM. CODE § 9504(3) (West 1964); See also SENATE FACT FIND-
ING COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 6TH PROG. RPT. TO THE LEGIS. pt. 1, the UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, at 587 (1959-1961). Subdivision (3) of 9504 was changed
in the California version by setting forth specifically what constitutes
timely notice in the place of the provision of subsection (3) of section
9-504 of the Official Text which provides merely for "reasonable notice".
The change was made to avoid controversy in each case as to whether the
notice was reasonable by substituting a definite standard.
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ducted in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner. 10
If the secured party sells the collateral, he must account for any
surplus and unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any
deficiency.1 ' In the event the creditor wrongfully fails to comply
with the resale provisions of the California Commercial Code, the
debtor or any person entitled to notification, or whose security has
been made known to the secured party prior to the disposition, is
entitled to recover any loss resulting from this failure.12
The main issue was whether the debtor, in addition to his claim
for damages, may also prevent the creditor from recovering a
deficiency where the secured party fails to notify the debtor before
disposition of the collateral, or where the sale is not conducted in a
commercially reasonable manner. In such cases, the authorities are
divided over whether to indulge the secured party's claim for a
deficiency.' 3 In view of the lack of unanimity of interpretations by
various state courts and in the absence of decisions on the point in
California, the Atlas case arose. The pro-deficiency view, adopted
by many courts, is that the secured party who fails to notify the
debtor may still claim his deficiency if he can prove that the resale
obtained fair value for the collateral.' 4 The anti-deficiency view
bars the secured party from claiming any deficiency where he fails
to give proper notice.' 5 This view, adopted by the Appellate Court
in Atlas, represents a statement of the law in California.
The U.C.C. and its official comments do not discuss the relation-
ship between the debtor's liability for a deficiency and the secured
party's liability for damages for non-compliance with the required
10. CAL. COM. CODE § 9504(3) (West 1964).
11. CAL. COM. CODE § 9504(2) (West 1964).
12. CAL. COM. CODE § 9507(1) (West 1964).
13. White, Representing the Low-Income Consumer in Repossessions,
Resales and Deficiency Judgment Cases, 3 U.C.C.L.J. 199, 220 (1971), 64 Nw.
U.L. REV. 808, 832-33 (1970).
14. Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402
(Dist. Ct. 1971); T & W Ice Cream, Inc. v. Carriage Barn, Inc., 107 N.J.
Super. 328, 258 A.2d 162, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 1230 (Bergen County Cts. L. Div.
1969); Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 415
(Alas. 1969); Barker v. Horn, 245 Ark. 315, 432 S.W.2d 21 (1968).15. Leasco Data Process Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d
1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Civ. Ct. 1971); Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963) vacated on other grounds, 335 F.2d
846 (3d Cir. 1964); Braswell v. American National Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699,
161 S.E.2d 420 (1968); Bergen Auto. v. Mattarochio, 58 N.J. Super. 161, 155
A.2d 787 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959).
default procedures. 6 While U.C.C. section 9-504 (2) states that the
debtor will be liable for any deficiency, some courts have insisted
that personal notice and commercially reasonable resale of the
collateral are conditions precedent to recovery of a deficiency
judgment. 17 These courts rule that notice is essential since without
it, the debtor has been denied the right of redemption given him by
section 9-506.18 In addition the courts reason that U.C.C. section
9-507, which does provide remedies for the wronged debtor, has
nothing to do with defenses to a deficiency action but is intended
only to provide an affirmative cause of action for a loss that has
already been sustained-not a substitute for a defense to an action
for a deficiency.' 9
In Atlas, the California Appelate Court based its opinion on the
general construction provisions of the U.C.C., prior California case
law, recent case law from out of state and the U.C.C. default pro-
visions themselves.
The Court cited section 1-102 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
which provides in subsection (1); "This Code shall be liberally
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and
policies." Subsection (2) (c) states "Underlying purposes and
policies of the Code are . . . to make uniform the law among the
various jurisdictions." The Court then quoted § 1-103 of the Code,
stating in effect that unless displaced by particular provisions of
the Code, the prior commercial laws supplement the Code provisions.
The conclusion of the Court was that U.C.C. § 9-507 is not expressly
made an exclusive remedy and does not purport to have any bearing
on deficiency judgments.
For California pre-code precedent, the Court referred to two cases:
Methany v. Davis20 and Rocky Mountain Export Company v. Col-
quitt,21 recalling that under California chattel mortgage law, a
mortgagee who disposed of mortgaged property after default with-
out following the notice requirements of the statute and the mort-
gage was barred from recovering a deficiency judgment.
Out of state precedent principally relied on by the Court was the
16. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, 44.9.4 at
1262 (1965).
17. Edmondson v. Air Service Co., 123 Ga. App. 263, 180 S.E.2d 589
(1971); Climonetto v. Keepes, 501 P.2d 1017 (Wyo. 1972).
18. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-506.
19. Braswell v. American Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420
(1968); Leasco Data Process Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d
1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Civ. Ct. 1971); Foundation Discounts, Inc. v. Serna,
81 N.M. 474, 468 P.2d 875 (1970).
20. 107 Cal. App. 137, 290 P. 91 (1930).
21. 179 Cal. App. 2d 204, 3 Cal. Rptr. 512 (1960).
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1971 New York case of Leasco Data Process Equipment Corporation
v. Atlas Shirt Company Inc.22 This case arose from an action to
recover a deficiency judgment by a secured creditor who sold
leased property after repossession. The New York Court held that
failure of the secured creditor to notify the debtor, after repossession,
of the time at which the equipment was to be sold to the highest
bidder precluded the creditor from recovering a deficiency judg-
ment.23 The carefully written opinion relied on earlier New York
case law. It stated that prior to passage of the Code in New York,
the common law rule was: "In the absence of contractual provisions,
the obligation of the debtor was terminated when the conditional
vendor repossessed. ' ' 24  Similarly, the anti-deficiency principal
became firmly established in New York as it had in virtually all
states which had adopted the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. The
right of the conditional vendor to secure a deficiency judgment was
dependent on precise compliance with statutory requirements as to
notice. 25 Leasco went on to draw three distinctions as to cases in
which different conclusions had been reached in other jurisdic-
tions. 26
First the Leasco Court concluded that none of the decisions from
other jurisdictions referred to the presence in that jurisdiction of a
settled interpretation of the corresponding provisions of the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act, such as existed in New York. While these
pro-deficiency decisions took notice of a comparable body of law
in their jurisdictions, the Court felt that the failure to refer to it
and to describe how it had been changed by the new statutory
language surely undermined its authority.
Secondly, the New York Court stated that none of the opinions
undertook a detailed textual analysis of the Code. Elaborating,
Leasco asserted that U.C.C. § 9-507 makes no direct allusion to the
circumstances under which a right to a deficiency may arise. It
emphasized the language in § 9-507 used to articulate the affirmative
action phraseology, as well as the complete lack of defense termi-
nology found there. The Court then concluded that § 9-507 was
only intended to provide an affirmative action, that it was far more
22. 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1090, 323 N.Y.S.2d at. 15.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1092-3, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
probable that the authors of the Code never contemplated that a
secured party could recover a deficiency judgment after violating
the statutory command of notice.
Finally, the New York Court asserted that out of state courts
reaching the above conclusion were so disturbed by the harsh and
unfair consequences following deficiency judgments that strenuous
judicial efforts were made to mitigate these consequences. The
most common formula was to create a presumption that the re-
possessed item had the value of the outstanding debt and to place
upon the secured party the burden of proving a different value.2 7
Endorsing the New York Court's analysis, the California Court in
Atlas affirmed that consideration of "the most natural and reason-
able construction of the statutory language in the light of the
legal background, the realities of the relationship involved between
secured creditors and debtors who have defaulted and their re-
spective financial resources for engaging in litigation, all lead to
the conclusion that the right to a deficiency judgment depends on
compliance with the statutory requirements concerning dispositions
and notice."28
In barring a creditor's right to a deficiency judgment where
California Commercial Code protections of notice to the debtor and
commercially reasonable sale are not followed, the courts have
provided greater motivation to the creditor to secure the best pos-
sible price, (which presumably is most likely to result from a
commercially reasonable sale of the secured collateral). The
remote and unrealistic threat of an action for damages under
U.C.C. section 9-507 from a pressed and defaulting debtor by itself
is not enough to ensure significant efforts to maximize proceeds of
the sale. If deficiencies were allowed under these conditions, a
creditor might well prefer to sell quickly to friends or to himself
(as in the Atlas case). His bonus or reward could well be to make
auction fees, cement business friendships with distress sale buyers,
and then to collect his deficiency. California's affirmative defense
should go far to inhibit sharp practices by unscrupulous secured
parties.
As to the California Commercial Code requirement of personal
notice to the debtor of intended sale, the opportunity to redeem
seems only equitable. It is a matter of due process and consonant
with constitutional principles of justice and fair play. Though
notice may seem futile and a holdover from three centuries of
27. Id. at 1093, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
28. 27 Cal. App. 3d at 1009, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 321 (1972).
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equity court protections of mortgagors, it is still desirable.2 9  In-
creased debtor education and sophistication plus wider availability
of credit provide the debtor with the opportunity to search for a
retail bidder for his repossessed property or to make a last-ditch
effort to raise money for redemption.
In a recent study by P. Shuchman, Profit on Default; an Archival
Study of Automobile Repossessions and Resale, it is suggested that
resale procedures themselves should be the focus of the courts
attention rather than the denial of creditors' deficiencies. 30 This
approach seems unrealistic, for it is difficult for court-made law
to embrace the varying types of commercial practices in a piece-
meal approach. If regulation of the resale procedures is to be
effected, it should be comprehensively designed by legislatures or
the U.C.C. should be amended to enunciate, as the California Court
has done, the right of the debtor to an affirmative defense when
Code safeguards are not observed.
California, by providing debtors with this affirmative defense,
has gone a long way to motivate creditors to carry out the spirit and
letter of the Uniform Commercial Code and to guarantee an oppor-
tunity to the debtor to redeem or at least to enjoy the benefits of a
commercially reasonable resale.
GAIL CLIFFORD HUTTON
29. 2 GILMORE, supra note 16, 44.2 at 1216.
30. 22 STAN. L. REV. 20 (1969).

